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RETURN OF THE DE MINIMIS EXCEPTION IN 
DIGITAL MUSIC SAMPLING: THE NINTH 
CIRCUIT’S RECENT HOLDING IN VMG SALSOUL 
IMPROVES UPON THE SIXTH CIRCUIT’S 
HOLDING IN BRIDGEPORT, BUT RAISES 
QUESTIONS OF ITS OWN 
INTRODUCTION 
Sampling is a musical production practice that has become increasingly 
common since the 1980s.1 A producer samples by copying a section of a 
sound recording and inserting it into the piece of music she is producing.2 
The type of sound recording sampled by producers can vary vastly from 
piece to piece. Numerous pop and hip hop songs sample from songs of 
various genres (rock, classical music, or other pop songs, for example).3 
Audio from a film, commercial, or speech may also be inserted into a 
song. Typically, the purpose of these samples is either to make use of the 
musical value of the sample or to trigger some sense of familiarity in the 
listener.4 Some artists have made a career entirely out of sampling sections 
of different songs and fusing them into one piece.5 
Often, samples are somehow altered or adapted to make the sound fit 
within the new piece.6 This may include altering pitch, key, or speed, and 
may require the producer to isolate the sample from other sounds that 
occur simultaneously in the original work.7 Samples also tend to be short 
segments of the original work, no more than a few seconds long.8 
However, while these are the trends in sampling, they are not the rule.9 
Predictably, sampling creates a copyright issue when the sampled piece 
is under copyright and the sampling producer does not acquire a license to 
 
 
 1.  Daniel Esannason, Note, Get a License or Don’t Sample: Using Examples from Popular 
Music to Raise New Questions About the Bridgeport v. Dimension Films Holding, 29 HARV. J. L. & 
TECH. 551, 557–58 (2016).  
 2.  Id. at 561–64. 
 3.  See id. at 561–64. 
 4.  See John Schietinger, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films: How the Sixth Circuit 
Missed a Beat on Digital Music Sampling, 55 DEPAUL L. REV 209, 210–14 (2005). 
 5.  See Ryan Lloyd, Note, Unauthorized Digital Sampling in the Changing Music Landscape, 22 
J. INTELL. PROP. L. 143, 171 (2014) (discussing the sample-heavy DJ known as Girl Talk). 
 6.  Schietinger, supra note 4, at 210–14. 
 7.  Esannason, supra note 1, at 561–64. 
 8.  Id.  
 9.  Lloyd, supra note 5, at 171 (discussing the DJ Girl Talk). 
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use the sampled copyrighted material.10 
In a number of copyright contexts outside of music sampling, courts 
have found that there exists a de minimis exception to copyright 
infringement.11 This exception provides that even where copyrighted 
material is used without a license, in cases where the use was particularly 
brief or otherwise insubstantial, the unlicensed use will not constitute 
copyright infringement, even if all other elements of copyright 
infringement are met.12 
Within the context of the music industry, a circuit split has emerged 
with respect to the recognition of the de minimis exception. Specifically, 
the split revolves around recognition of the exception where a producer of 
a musical work samples a copyrighted digital sound recording without 
license to do so.13 In 2005, the Sixth Circuit held in Bridgeport Music, Inc. 
v. Dimension Films that the de minimis exception does not exist in the 
context of digital sound sampling.14 Therefore, the court held, all 
unlicensed sampling of copyrighted digital sound recordings is completely 
prohibited, no matter how short or minimal the sample.15  
Eleven years later, in 2016, the Ninth Circuit reached the opposite 
conclusion, holding that a de minimis exception does exist in the context 
of digital sound sampling.16 Therefore, unlicensed sampling of 
copyrighted digital sound recordings does not constitute copyright 
infringement if the average audience would not recognize the 
appropriation.17 While the Ninth Circuit’s opinion is persuasive in its legal 
analysis, which focuses heavily on congressional intent,18 the average 
audience test for de minimis use that follows from its ruling creates certain 
significant problems that do not exist under the Sixth Circuit’s bright-line 
rule prohibiting all unlicensed sampling.19 
Parts I, II, and III of this note will explain the differences between the 
 
 
 10.  Lauren Fontein Brandes, From Mozart to Hip-Hop: The Impact of Bridgeport v. Dimension 
Films on Musical Creativity, 14 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 93, 94–95 (2007).  
 11.  Id. See Sandoval v. New Line Cinema Corp., 147 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 1998); Gordon v. Nextel 
Communications, 345 F.3d 922 (6th Cir. 2003); Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 12.  The de minimis defense “is applicable when a defendant’s copying was so small and trivial 
that it should be allowed.” See Lloyd, supra note 5, at 152. 
 13.  Compare Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005), with 
VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 14.  Bridgeport Music, 410 F.3d at 798. 
 15.  See id. 
 16.  VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 880–81. 
 17.  The court held that a use is de minimis if the average audience would not recognize the 
appropriation. See id. 
 18.  See infra Part II. See generally VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 878. 
 19.  See infra Part III. See generally Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 792; VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 878.  
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Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in Bridgeport and the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning 
in VMG Salsoul. While the focus of these parts is on illustrating the flaws 
in the Sixth Circuit’s legal analysis, it will also introduce the 
complications that arise from the Ninth Circuit’s average audience test, 
which do not exist under the Sixth Circuit’s simpler, bright-line rule. Part 
IV will introduce scholarly criticism of another test used in copyright 
contexts—the substantial similarity test—and examine the ways in which 
the average audience test announced by the Ninth Circuit in VMG Salsoul 
shares the same flaws for which the substantial similarity test has been 
criticized. Finally, Part V will examine proposals for improving upon the 
average audience test.  
I. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT’S ANALYSIS IN BRIDGEPORT 
In 2003, prior to the Bridgeport decision in 2005, the court in Newton 
v. Diamond applied the de minimis exception to music sampling.20 When 
Bridgeport came to the District Court for the Middle District of 
Tennessee, the court followed the lead of Newton. The Bridgeport court 
held that the de minimis exception applied to the defendant (the band 
N.W.A.) in its unlicensed sampling of a four-second guitar riff from a 
song by plaintiff George Clinton, Jr.21 
On appeal, however, the Sixth Circuit held that the de minimis 
exception does not exist for the purposes of musical sampling, no matter 
how short or insubstantial the sample may appear.22 The court succinctly 
summarized, “Get a license or do not sample.”23 The court reached this 
holding on the theory that not recognizing a de minimis exception in cases 
of sampling comports with a plain-language reading of 17 U.S.C. § 
114(b), part of the Copyright Act,24 and best serves public policy through 
the implementation of a clear, bright-line rule.25 
First, the court held that a plain-language reading of the Copyright Act 
supports the notion that unlicensed sampling should be entirely 
 
 
 20.  See Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2003). In Newton v. Diamond, the 
Beastie Boys and their managers and producers had sampled a three-note sequence plus one 
background note from a copyrighted recording of a flautist. Id. The plaintiff flautist was unsuccessful 
in his claim of copyright infringement, even though the sequence was admittedly sampled from his 
own copyrighted recording, on the grounds that the sample was de minimis. Id. 
 21.  Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 792.  
 22.  Id. at 799–805. 
 23.  Id. at 801. 
 24.  17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (2012). 
 25.  Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 799–805. 
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prohibited.26 The Copyright Act includes language stating that license 
holders have the exclusive right to sample their own work. The court 
interpreted this language to mean that no one other than a license holder 
has the right to sample licensed sound recordings.27 
Next, the court held that the congressional intent underlying the Act 
was not relevant to the case.28 While the defendants had argued that the 
legislative history of the Act indicated an intention to prevent the stifling 
of creativity rather than an intent to protect copyright holders’ property 
rights,29 the court noted that digital music sampling did not exist when the 
statute was passed.30 The court decided that Congress’s inability at the 
time of the statute’s passing to contemplate present-day musical sampling 
rendered the defendants’ argument unpersuasive, and made the legislative 
history documents for the Copyright Act inapplicable to the facts of 
Bridgeport.31 
Furthermore, the court held that completely prohibiting unlicensed 
sampling does not actually stifle creativity in any meaningful way.32 The 
court noted that alternatives exist to sampling in cases where a producer 
wishes to mimic a sound from another piece.33 For example, a producer 
could simply reproduce the sound in a studio if the producer has access to 
the same instrument.34 Since this alternative exists, the prohibition of 
unlicensed sampling does not, according to the court, prevent producers 
from following their creative impulses.35 
Finally, the court noted that a bright-line rule would best promote the 
important public policy goal of clarity in copyright contexts.36 The court 
stated that in copyright cases, clear and easily interpreted rules are 
particularly important.37 The court noted that the elimination of the de 
minimis exception in digital sampling cases would provide much greater 
clarity than recognition of a de minimis exception.38 Producers would 
know that they cannot sample without a license, and copyright or license 
 
 
 26.  Id. at 799–802. 
 27.  Id. at 799–805. 
 28.  Id. at 805. 
 29.  Id. at 795–97. 
 30.  Id. at 805. 
 31.  Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 805. 
 32.  Id. at 801. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. at 801–02. 
 37.  Bridgeport, 410 F.3d at 802. 
 38.  Id. 
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holders would know that any unlicensed sample is automatically illegal.39 
Recognition of a de minimis exception could potentially leave producers 
and copyright holders unsure as to the legality of a musical piece including 
sampled material until it had been challenged in court.40 Thus, the court 
held that not recognizing a de minimis exception better served the public 
policy goals sought by the judicial system in the area of copyright law.41 
II. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S ANALYSIS IN VMG SALSOUL 
In 2013, VMG Salsoul v. Ciccone arose in the Central District of 
California. VMG Salsoul, a company that owned the Salsoul record label, 
sued Warner Brothers and Madonna Louis Ciccone (known in the music 
industry simply as Madonna) for copyright infringement.42 Madonna, in 
her song “Vogue,” published by a Warner Brothers-owned record label, 
had sampled a “horn hit” (a chord played on the horn) from the song 
“Love Break” by The Salsoul Orchestra.43 “Love Break” was held under 
copyright by the Salsoul record label, and VMG Salsoul sued Warner 
Brothers and Madonna in an attempt to enforce its copyright.44 
The District Court for the Central District of California held that even 
if there had been appropriation subject to copyright protection, Madonna’s 
copying of the horn hit was de minimis.45 On these grounds, it granted 
summary judgment for the defendants.46 The court noted that the plaintiff 
had relied on Bridgeport in its opposition to the defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment, but found that Bridgeport was inapplicable, in part 
because Sixth Circuit decisions are not binding on the Ninth Circuit, 
which had not yet adopted the Bridgeport decision.47 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s holding that 
any copying, if it existed, was de minimis, and thus did not constitute 
copyright infringement.48 It therefore affirmed the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment to the defendants.49 The Ninth Circuit noted that in 
 
 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, No. CV 12-05967 BRO, 2013 WL 8600435, at *1 (C.D. Cal. 
2013). 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. at * 9. 
 48.  VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 878 n.6 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 49.  Id. at 874. 
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reaching this conclusion it was directly contradicting the Sixth Circuit’s 
decision in Bridgeport, creating a circuit split.50 The court called it an 
“unusual step” to intentionally create a circuit split and noted that a circuit 
split would be “particularly troublesome in the realm of copyright”51 given 
the importance of consistent rules in the field.52 However, the opinion also 
emphasized that the goal of avoiding circuit splits is subordinate to the 
duty to interpret congressional intent.53 Since the court determined that the 
Sixth Circuit had failed to properly factor congressional intent into its 
decision, the Ninth Circuit was willing to reach a contradictory ruling.54 
As noted in Part I, the Sixth Circuit had explicitly decided not to 
consider legislative history indicating Congress’s intent in enacting the 
Copyright Act.55 The reasoning behind this decision was that digital 
sampling did not exist at the time of the passage of the bill, so Congress’s 
intent could not be applied to cases related to digital sampling.56 The Ninth 
Circuit wholly rejected this line of reasoning in VMG Salsoul.57 It held that 
the legislative history indicated that Congress’s intent in passing 17 U.S.C. 
§ 114(b) was to promote creativity and protect against overly broad 
copyright restrictions that would stifle creativity.58 The Ninth Circuit held 
that given this intent, it was unreasonable for the Sixth Circuit to interpret 
the language of the act to prohibit all unlicensed uses of a copyrighted 
work.59 Since it had found the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of the 
Copyright Act in Bridgeport to be directly contradictory to clear 
congressional intent, the court opted not to follow the Sixth Circuit’s 
conclusion that de minimis exceptions should not be recognized in cases of 
digital musical sampling.60 Instead, it affirmed the decision of the lower 
court that a de minimis analysis was appropriate.61 
Having decided that a de minimis exception should be recognized in 
digital music copyright cases, the court announced it would employ the 
average audience test to determine whether the use of an unlicensed 
 
 
 50.  Id. at 886. 
 51.  Id. (quoting Seven Arts Filmed Entm’t Ltd. v. Content Media Corp., 733 F.3d 1251 (9th Cir. 
2013)). 
 52.  VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 886.  
 53.  Id. at 883–86. 
 54.  Id. at 883. 
 55.  See Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 805 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 883–87. 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. at 886–87. 
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sample is considered de minimis.62 If an average audience would be unable 
to recognize the appropriation, then the unlicensed use was de minimis and 
would not be considered copyright infringement.63 Otherwise, it was not 
de minimis, and the traditional copyright analysis would apply.64 
III. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE BRIDGEPORT DECISION 
Criticism of the Bridgeport decision is extensive and comes from a 
variety of sources.65 Commentators have generally focused on the court’s 
legal analysis.66 Specifically, their criticism is focused on the decision to 
avoid considering legislative intent.67 However, the court’s emphasis on 
seeking a bright-line rule was not unfounded.68 It emerged from well-
established principles in copyright law favoring rules with predictable 
outcomes.69 The first subpart of this section will discuss the criticism of 
the Bridgeport opinion and establish that the criticism was generally 
centered on the court’s failure to consider legislative history. The second 
subpart will analyze the reasons for copyright law’s emphasis on 
predictability and discuss why the Bridgeport rule is more successful than 
the VMG Salsoul rule in addressing predictability concerns. 
A. Criticism of the Bridgeport Decision 
Almost immediately following the Bridgeport decision’s promulgation, 
commentators widely expressed outrage that the Sixth Circuit had read a 
statute designed to protect creative enterprises in a manner that would 
instead stifle creativity.70 The court’s decision to completely ignore the 
legislative history of the Copyright Act was, perhaps, the greatest target of 
criticism.71 Commentators viewed the court’s stated reasoning—that 
digital sampling did not exist at the time the statute was enacted—as a 
deficient justification for its decision not to consider the legislative 
history.72 
 
 
 62.  VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 878. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  See, e.g., Brandes, supra note 10, at 104–06; Schietinger, supra note 4, at 230–242; Lloyd, 
supra note 5. 
 66.  See Brandes, supra note 10, at 104–06. 
 67.  See id. 
 68.  See Steven J. Horowitz, Copyright’s Asymmetric Uncertainty, 79 U. CHI. L. REV 331 (2012). 
 69.  See id. 
 70.  See Brandes, supra note 10, at 104–06. 
 71.  See id.; Schietinger, supra note 4, at 230–42. 
 72.  Schietinger, supra note 4, at 230–42. 
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Scholarly commentators were not the only source of criticism of the 
Bridgeport opinion.73 District courts throughout the country routinely 
failed to follow the standard set out by the Sixth Circuit.74 These courts 
would often cite congressional intent in their reasoning for recognizing the 
existence of a de minimis exception in music copyright contexts.75 
Given the widespread criticism of the Sixth Circuit’s holding in 
Bridgeport76 and the Ninth Circuit’s own history of decisions more 
favorable to the de minimis exception,77 it seemed likely that a circuit split 
would eventually occur. Commentator dissatisfaction with Bridgeport—
and, indeed, the Ninth Circuit’s conflicting holding in VMG Salsoul—
stems from the fact that the Sixth Circuit sidestepped Congress’s intent in 
passing 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) even though this intent appeared to directly 
contradict the court’s holding. 
The legislative history that the Sixth Circuit explicitly ignored in its 
opinion clearly indicates that Congress’s intent in passing 17 U.S.C. § 
114(b) was to avoid stifling creativity through copyrights.78 To read 
language in the statute as restricting the use of sound recordings 
exclusively to license holders, when Congress’s intent in passing the 
statute was to limit the rights of copyright holders, entirely ignores the 
legislature’s goals79 and was an “unprecedented holding unanticipated . . . 
by the Copyright Act itself.”80 It is true that digital sampling did not exist 
at the time the legislature enacted 17 U.S.C. § 114(b).81 However, if 
Congress’s intent in passing the bill can be understood as an intent to 
restrict copyright holders’ rights, then it was improper for the Sixth Circuit 
to interpret language in that statute to achieve precisely the opposite 
effect.82 
 
 
 73.  Lloyd, supra note 5, at 159. 
       74.   Id. at 165. District courts outside the purview of the Sixth Circuit were not bound by the 
Bridgeport decision. Id. See Saregama India, Ltd. v. Mosley, 687 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1340; 
TufAmerica, Inc. v. Diamond, 968 F. Supp. 2d 588, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Steward v. West, No. 
CV1302449BROJCX, 2014 WL 12591933, at *8 n.8 (C.D. Cal Aug. 14, 2014).  
 75.  Lloyd, supra note 5, at 159–61. See also Saregama, 687 F. Supp. 2d at 1340 (“[T]he 
Bridgeport court’s reading of Section 114(b)’s similar-sounding work provision is more expansive 
than its text and legislative history suggest.”). 
 76.  See Schietinger, supra note 4, at 230–42; Brandes, supra note 10, at 104–06; Esannason, 
supra note 1; Lloyd, supra note 5. 
 77.  See generally Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 78.  See Schietinger, supra note 4, at 236–42; Brandes, supra note 10, at 104–06; Esannason, 
supra note 1; Lloyd, supra note 5. 
 79.  See Schietinger, supra note 4, at 230–42. 
 80.  Lloyd, supra note 5, at 164. 
 81.  See Schietinger, supra note 4, at 215–16. 
 82.  Id. at 210; Brandes, supra note 10, at 104–06; Esannason, supra note 1, at 558–60; Lloyd, 
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B. Advantages of the Bridgeport Rule 
Despite deficiencies in its legal analysis, the Sixth Circuit’s argument 
that a bright-line rule better serves public policy is not without merit. 
Indeed, it is a well-established tenet of copyright law that unpredictability 
should be avoided wherever possible.83 In fact, this is part of the reason for 
the circuit courts’ jurisdiction over copyright issues like the one in 
Bridgeport.84 The federal system has exclusive jurisdiction over copyright 
law because the legislature has determined that it is particularly important 
both for copyright holders and for users of copyrighted material to 
understand the legality of their actions.85 Since the federal system is more 
capable of providing a single, uniform set of rules regarding copyrights, it 
was deemed preferable to the state system, wherein a patchwork of 
different state copyright rules might have led to confusion for copyright 
holders and innovators.86 Clarity and consistency are prized in the area of 
copyright law almost above all else.87  
The benefits of achieving clarity in copyright law have long been 
advanced by economists.88 The classical economic theory regarding 
copyright is that there are tandem benefits both for the holders of 
copyrights and for users of copyrighted material where rules are clear and 
court decisions are easy to predict.89 
The copyright holder generally seeks “(1) a reliable entitlement (2) 
prohibiting at least literal or close copying of their work, which is (3) 
protected by remedies sufficient both to deter copying and to compensate 
for any losses that result from it.”90 Where any of these three protections is 
not established, the copyright holder risks a devaluation of the work she 
holds under license.91 In particular, the prohibition of copying protected 
work (the second area) and the existence of remedies for deterrence and 
 
 
supra note 5, at 163–70. 
 83.  See Horowitz, supra note 68. 
 84.  See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel & Co., 376 U.S. 225, 228–31 (1964). 
 85.  Id.  
 86.  See Sears, 376 U.S. at 231 n.7 (noting that “the purpose of Congress to have national 
uniformity in patent and copyright laws can be inferred” and that this inference arises from “such 
statutes as that which vests exclusive jurisdiction to hear patent and copyright cases in federal courts . . 
. and that section of the Copyright Act which expressly saves state protection of unpublished writings 
but does not include published writings.”).  
 87.  Id.; Horowitz, supra note 68, at 337. 
 88.  Horowitz, supra note 68.  
 89.  Id.; Laura G. Lape, The Metaphysics of the Law: Bringing Substantial Similarity Down to 
Earth, 98 DICK. L. REV. 181, 202 n.2 (1994). 
 90.  Horowitz, supra note 68, at 337. See also Lape, supra note 89, at 198–206. 
 91.  Horowitz, supra note 68, at 337. 
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compensation (the third area) are relevant in a discussion of digital music 
sampling. 
Traditional economic theory suggests that uncertainty in copyright law 
can create serious problems for the copyright holder.92 Any randomness in 
court decisions would mean that the copyright holder’s ability to protect 
herself against the devaluation of her licensed work is unpredictable.93 
This reduces the expected value of investing in work that the copyright 
holder intends to hold.94  
Consider a potential copyright holder who can only correctly predict 
with eighty percent success which of her licensed works will be protected 
from infringement, while in the other twenty percent of cases she is wholly 
unable to extract value from the licensed work. The copyright holder 
would be less likely to allocate resources toward creating the licensed 
work than she would in a world where she could predict court decisions 
with one hundred percent accuracy, because each investment carries a 
greater risk of devaluation.95 
Conversely, the user of copyrighted works is generally concerned with 
“whether his expressive activity will constitute infringement and, if so, 
whether the remedies for infringement will be proportional to the harm 
caused.”96 Where either of these concerns is not addressed by copyright 
law, the user of copyrighted works risks losing the benefits he sought in 
engaging in his expressive activity, or even risks paying damages in an 
amount significantly greater than the benefit he gained from engaging in 
his expressive activity.97 
Uncertainty in copyright law limits the willingness of users of 
copyrighted material to engage in expressive activity due to the risk of 
triggering penalties.98 Consider a user of copyrighted material who can 
predict with eighty percent accuracy whether her use of copyrighted 
material within an artistic endeavor will constitute infringement. This user 
is less likely to engage in all artistic endeavors than a user who can predict 
with one hundred percent accuracy whether her use of copyrighted 
material will constitute infringement.99 While the perfectly accurate 
predictor can channel all of her time and energy into work that she knows 
 
 
 92.  Horowitz, supra note 68, at 337. 
 93.  See Horowitz, supra note 68, at 337–42; see also Lape, supra note 89, at 198–206. 
 94.  Horowitz, supra note 68, at 337. 
 95.  Horowitz, supra note 68, at 337. 
 96.  Id. at 342. 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  See Horowitz, supra note 68, at 342. 
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will not violate copyrights, the eighty percent accurate predictor is less 
likely to recoup the benefits that she anticipates from engaging in the 
activity and is more likely to pay penalties as a result of the activity. Thus, 
the eighty percent accurate predictor runs the risk of paying penalties far 
out of proportion with what she could have hoped to gain from engaging 
in the activity. Since “copyright aims to promote maximal expression,”100 
and uncertainty deters users of copyrighted material from engaging in 
expressive activity due to the risk of paying unanticipated penalties, 
uncertainty creates incentives that run counter to the goals of copyright 
law.101 
In addition to the above-mentioned issues, the prospect of litigation 
related to copyright infringement increases costs for both holders and 
users of copyrighted material.102 This too can be a deterrent to holders’ 
investment in licensed work and to users’ engaging in expressive 
activity.103 
A newer theory has emerged that uncertainty in copyright law does not 
harm copyright holders as much as users of copyrighted material.104 This 
theory suggests that copyright holders are not as sensitive to risk as users 
of copyrighted material, since holders do not face as stiff penalties from 
infringement.105 Furthermore, users of copyrighted material are less likely 
to be on notice than copyright holders regarding the legality of their 
actions.106 While this newer approach runs counter to the traditional 
economic theory of why uncertainty in copyright law is problematic, it 
nonetheless “confirms the conclusion” that “uncertainty is intolerable.”107 
It is clear, then, that uncertainty in copyright law, and rules which 
create “randomness”108 or unpredictability in potential copyright lawsuits, 
run counter to the goals of copyright law. While predictability is not the 
only concern of copyright law, it is a significant one. In some fairly 
obvious ways, the Ninth Circuit’s solution may lead to less predictable 
 
 
 100.  Id. at 385. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. (“Uncertainty . . . makes users more likely to risk liability . . . for the deterrent effect of 
liability is reduced where the costs are uncertain for risk-seeking users .”). See also Lape, supra note 
89, at 202 (noting an “advantage” where courts can ensure “prediction of litigation outcomes will be 
more accurate” in a copyright context.). 
 103.  See Horowitz, supra note 68, at 337–43 (noting that a copyright user is “concerned with 
whether his expressive activity will constitute infringement and, if so, whether . . . his liability has a 
reasonable ceiling”); Lape, supra note 89, at 202. 
 104.  Horowitz, supra note 68, at 384–85.  
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. at 384. 
 108.  Id. at 353. 
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court decisions than the Sixth Circuit’s solution. 
It is apparent that a bright-line rule promotes clarity and leads to 
predictable decisions. The Sixth Circuit’s holding that all unlicensed 
sampling, no matter how minor, constitutes infringement,109 certainly falls 
within the category of such bright-line rules. Any copyright holder who 
becomes aware of an unlicensed sampling can, under this rule, know that 
she has suffered copyright infringement. Any user of copyrighted 
materials knows that in sampling without a license, she commits copyright 
infringement and becomes liable for damages. The lack of flexibility helps 
to move the universe of copyright law toward greater predictability of 
potential disputes, which, as noted above, is one of the foremost goals of 
copyright law.110 
Thus, if the average audience test is less effective than a bright-line test 
in creating predictable outcomes, it will necessarily be less effective than 
the Sixth Circuit’s rule in promoting this particular goal of copyright law.  
IV. THE AVERAGE AUDIENCE TEST AS COMPARED TO THE SUBSTANTIAL 
SIMILARITY TEST 
The average audience test is the test adopted by the Ninth Circuit in 
deciding whether an unlicensed use of a copyrighted sound recording will 
constitute a de minimis use, and therefore not be considered 
infringement.111 In VMG Salsoul, the Ninth Circuit defined the average 
audience test as follows: “A ‘use is de minimis only if the average 
audience would not recognize the appropriation.’”112 The horn hit sampled 
by the defendant was found by the court to fit within the de minimis 
exception because the length of the sample (less than a quarter of a 
second)113 and the alterations conducted digitally by the defendant 
rendered it an appropriation unrecognizable to the average audience.114 
The substantial similarity test is the test used more broadly (not in de 
minimis cases) to determine whether a defendant’s work constitutes 
infringement upon a plaintiff’s copyright.115 While de minimis cases can 
 
 
 109.  See Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792, 801 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 110.  See Horowitz, supra note 68. 
 111.  See Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 112.  VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Newton, 388 F.3d 
at 1193) (emphasis added). 
 113.  VMG Salsoul, 824 F. 3d at 878–79. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  See Lape, supra note 89, at 185–86; Nicole Lieberman, Un-Blurring Substantial Similarity: 
Aesthetic Judgments and Romantic Authorship in Music Copyright Law, 6 NYU J. INTELL. PROP. & 
ENT. L. 91, 105 (2016). 
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provide exceptions even for clear copying and appropriation of another’s 
copyrighted work, the substantial similarity test is employed where there is 
a dispute between the parties as to whether a defendant has copied from 
the plaintiff and whether a defendant’s non-de minimis copying constitutes 
infringement.116 
The first subpart of this section discusses scholarly criticism of the 
substantial similarity test due to its failure to produce predictable 
outcomes. The second subpart will examine the similarities between the 
average audience test and the substantial similarity test, and discuss why 
the criticisms of the substantial similarity are almost equally applicable to 
the average audience test. Since the substantial similarity test is criticized 
for failing to provide predictable outcomes for copyright cases and the 
average audience test shares the elements of the substantial similarity test 
which have led to this criticism, it follows that the average audience test 
should likewise raise questions as to whether it is conducive to predictable 
outcomes. 
A. Criticism of the Substantial Similarity Test 
The average audience test is comparable to the substantial similarity 
test even though it occurs at a different stage of the copyright infringement 
analysis because it operates in a fundamentally similar way.117 The 
substantial similarity test has been described in a variety of different 
formulations,118 but one of the more common methods for determining 
whether a work is substantially similar to a prior copyrighted work (and 
therefore constitutes copyright infringement) involves determining the 
percentage of the defendant’s work that is like the plaintiff’s work.119 
There is no universally accepted cutoff for what percentage of the two 
works must be alike to find copyright infringement.120  
While the average audience test in de minimis contexts has not 
attracted significant scholarly criticism, the substantial similarity test 
has.121 One of the primary criticisms of the substantial similarity test is that 
 
 
 116.  Lape, supra note 89, at 182–85. 
 117.  See Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 1997); 
Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 118.  See Lape, supra note 89, at 191–94. 
 119.  Id. at 193–94.  
 120.  Id. 
 121.  See Lape, supra note 89, at 193–94; Amy B. Cohen, Masking Copyright Decisionmaking: 
The Meaninglessness of Substantial Similarity, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 719 (1987); Jason Palmer, 
“Blurred Lines” Means Changing Focus: Juries Composed of Musical Artists Should Decide 
Copyright Infringement Cases, Not Lay Juries, 18 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 907 (2016). 
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it fails to properly account for the basic concept of copying.122 Copying 
occurs where the defendant has used the plaintiff’s work rather than 
creating a similar work independently or by using common public domain 
sources.123 Traditionally, misappropriation has been defined as occurring 
where copying goes far enough to constitute improper appropriation.124 
The substantial similarity test essentially only considers whether a work is 
similar to the copyrighted one—not whether it has actually been copied—
and then finds misappropriation (and thus infringement) where the 
similarity is great enough to arrive at some arbitrary level deemed by the 
court to be substantial.125 
An example of this is provided in two district court cases arising from 
infringement claims in the fabric industry: Kenbrooke Fabrics v. Holland 
Fabrics126 and Lauratex Textile Corp. v. Allton Knitting Mills.127 In each 
of these cases, the court found that the defendant’s fabric pattern was 
nearly identical to the plaintiff’s copyrighted fabric pattern. Through the 
substantial similarity test, the courts determined that the plaintiff had 
infringed upon the defendant’s copyright.128 Both courts found copyright 
infringement without considering whether the defendants’ substantially 
similar fabric patterns had been designed independently from the 
plaintiffs’ patterns.129 The courts also both failed to consider whether the 
defendants’ patterns might have been inspired by public domain sources 
that had also influenced the plaintiffs’ design.130 While similarity between 
two works may logically lead to a presumption of copying, the substantial 
similarity test skips this step131 and automatically makes the inferential 
 
 
 122.  See Cohen, supra note 121, at 724–26.  
 123.  Id. at 724, 737. 
 124.  Id. at 731. 
 125.  See Lape, supra note 89, at 190–94. 
 126.  602 F. Supp. 151, 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
 127.  517 F. Supp. 900, 902–03 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
 128.  See Kenbrooke Fabrics, Inc., 602 F. Supp. at 154; Lauratex Textile Corp., 517 F. Supp. at 
902–03; Cohen, supra note 121, at 736–39. 
 129.  See Cohen, supra note 121, at 736–39. 
 130.  The issue of common inspiration through non-copyrighted sources is a complicated one for 
judges to resolve. See Cohen, supra note 121, at 725–26. In artistic fields, it is to be expected that 
copyrighted works might on occasion draw inspiration or borrow in some other way from prior works 
not under copyright. When a later work is found to be substantially similar to the copyrighted work, 
this presents an issue—under traditional notions of appropriation, a work inspired by the original, non-
copyrighted work has not “taken” anything from the copyrighted work. However, despite this lack of 
appropriation, it may be remarkably similar to the copyrighted work due to the common source of 
inspiration, and thus fail the substantial similarity test. This problem highlights the difficulties that a 
court may face in making the leap from similarity between works to appropriation of one work’s 
intellectual property by the creators of another work. See Cohen, supra note 121, at 725–26.  
 131.  Id. at 737 n.65. 
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leap from similarity to misappropriation.132 
Another common criticism of the substantial similarity test is that it 
fails to provide guidelines that allow judges or juries to make consistent or 
reasonable determinations of what constitutes infringement. 133 As noted 
above, courts have not announced a specific percentage of a defendant’s 
work which may be “like” a plaintiff’s copyrighted work before it rises to 
the level of being “substantially similar” to the plaintiff’s work.134 In 
Worth v. Selchow, a trivia book including roughly one-third of the facts 
from another copyrighted trivia book was found to be not substantially 
similar to the copyrighted book.135 Conversely, in WPOW, Inc. v. MRLJ 
Enterprises, the defendant’s broadcasting tower was found to infringe 
upon the plaintiff’s copyright on a design for broadcasting towers136 
because the defendant’s tower’s antenna—comprising far less than one-
third of the overall design—was found to be identical to that in the 
plaintiff’s design.137 The reasoning for this was that the antenna, while 
comprising a small percentage of the overall mass of the structure, was “in 
essence the heart of the work” and therefore constituted a taking of a 
substantial nature.138 
These divergent methods of quantifying substantial similarity represent 
only one of a myriad of examples of incongruity between decisions of 
 
 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Id. at 741–44. 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  See Lape, supra note 89, at 193–94 (citing Worth v. Selchow & Righter Co., 827 F.2d 569 
(9th Cir. 1987)). Worth did not hold that copying one third of another work cannot be infringement. 
Worth, 827 F.2d 569. In fact, the court indicated that its finding did not depend on a quantitative 
analysis of the copied materials but instead on the particular treatment that factual works, rather than 
fictional works, receive under copyright law. Id. at 573. Lape’s criticism of the substantial similarity 
test is not that it creates an incorrect quantitative standard, but rather that the absence of a meaningful 
standard for a finding of substantial similarity has led to confusing results. See Lape, supra note 89, at 
191–94.  
 136.  See Cohen, supra note 121, at 741 (citing WPOW, Inc. v. MRLJ Enterprises, 584 F. Supp. 
132 (D.D.C. 1984)). The defendant had registered a copyright on a design for broadcast towers used to 
broadcast radio signals across a local area. Id. The copyright included the design of the entire tower, 
which included a design for the broadcasting antenna. Id. The antenna itself represented only a small 
portion of the tower calculated by total mass. Id. at 742. The tower itself was a large structure, and the 
antenna was a minor fraction of the size of the rest of the tower. Id. However, the antenna was the 
most important part of the design of the tower for the purposes of the broadcast—the structure in 
general serves to elevate and support the antenna, which actually broadcasts the signal. The technology 
and the design of the antenna were by far the most sophisticated elements of the design of the 
structure. Id. The plaintiff had built a structure in which the broadcast tower itself, which supports the 
antenna, was materially different from the copyrighted design, but the antenna was very similar to that 
in the copyrighted design. Id. 
 137.  Id., supra note 121, at 742. 
 138.  WPOW, Inc. v. MRLJ Enterprises, 584 F. Supp. 132, 136 (D.D.C. 1984). 
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different courts.139 Some courts compare the similarity between part of the 
defendant’s work and part of the plaintiff’s work,140 while some compare 
the similarity between the entirety of the defendant’s work and the entirety 
of the plaintiff’s work.141 Even when courts agree on whether to focus on 
the part or the whole, the specific percentage threshold of similarity 
required for appropriation remains undefined.142 The result of this vast 
inconsistency between courts’ application of the substantial similarity test 
is confusion for producers of creative products and over-protection of 
copyright.143 
Yet another criticism of the substantial similarity test is that its focus 
on similarity rather than harm is inconsistent with the purposes of 
copyright law.144 The substantial similarity test, by focusing analysis 
entirely on the characteristics of the defendant’s work, does not include 
any consideration of the harm that a defendant’s work may do to the 
plaintiff.145 This may lead to cases in which infringement is found 
“without any injury or harm suffered by the copyright holder.”146 Rather 
than serving the purposes of protecting property rights, this approach 
generates a “random windfall to the copyright holder.”147 Furthermore, 
these findings of infringement without harm stifle creativity, as they 
needlessly block the production of creative efforts which would otherwise 
be allowable.148 If the purposes of copyright law are to protect property 
rights of copyright holders while promoting creativity, the substantial 
similarity test’s penchant for finding infringement where no harm accrues 
to the copyright holder is counter to the purposes of copyright law, 
because it both fails to protect property rights and stifles creativity.149  
 
 
 139.  See Lape, supra note 89, at 193–94; Cohen, supra note 121, at 741–43. Compare Atari, Inc. 
v. North American Philips Consumer Electronics Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) (where 
alterations made by the defendant to its product in order to differentiate it from the plaintiff’s product 
were found by the court to “emphasize the extent to which it deliberately copied from the plaintiffs’ 
work”), with Smith v. Weinstein, 578 F. Supp. 1297, 1304 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (where differences 
between the works were found to “undercut substantial similarity”) (quoting Warner Bros., Inc., 720 
F.2d 231, 40–41 (2d Cir. 1983), aff’d, 738 F.2d 419 (2nd. Cir. 1984)). 
 140.  Cohen, supra note 121, at 742. 
 141.  Id. at 742–43. 
 142.  Lape, supra note 89, at 193. 
 143.  Id. at 182. 
 144.  See id. 
 145.  Id. at 194–96. 
 146.  Id. at 196. 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  Id. at 197. 
 149.  Id. at 193–97. 
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B. Characteristics of the Substantial Similarity Test Shared by the Average 
Audience Test 
The average audience test adopted in VMG Salsoul is, in theory, 
different from the substantial similarity test. While the substantial 
similarity test involves an analysis of the actual differences between two 
sound recordings, the average audience test depends upon an analysis of a 
hypothetical “average” group’s perception of the difference between two 
sound recordings.150 
However, despite this conceptual distinction, in practice the average 
audience test mirrors many of the elements that have been criticized in the 
substantial similarity test. In the context of the facts of VMG Salsoul, it is 
easy to accept at face value the argument that an average audience would 
be unable to recognize the appropriation of the sampled material.151 The 
“horn hit” in question was less than a second long and had been digitally 
altered.152 An actual expert musicologist was unable, upon a preliminary 
analysis, to properly identify the appropriation.153 However, it will not 
always be so clear whether an average audience would recognize a sample 
as appropriation of the copyrighted recording. Where future de minimis 
cases fall closer to the borderline of appropriation recognizable to the 
average audience, the test stated by the Ninth Circuit may run into the 
same problems for which the substantial similarity test has been criticized.  
There is one respect in which the average audience test may represent 
an improvement upon the substantial similarity test: the average audience 
test does not automatically make the leap from similarity to 
misappropriation.154 Specifically, the average audience test as announced 
by the Ninth Circuit requires, for a finding of copyright infringement, that 
a sample’s appropriation of copyrighted material (not a sample’s 
similarity to copyrighted material) be recognizable to the average 
audience.155 This may allow the trier of fact to make a distinction between 
similarity and copying. Whether this distinction would have a material 
effect on the application of the test is unclear, but at least in its definition 
 
 
 150.  Compare Ringgold v. Black Entertainment Television, Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 75 (2d Cir. 1997), 
and Laureyssens v. Idea Group, Inc., 964 F.2d 131, 140 (2d Cir. 1992), with Newton v. Diamond, 388 
F.3d 1189, 1193 (9th Cir. 2003), and VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 
2016). 
 151.  See VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 871. 
 152.  Id. at 879. 
 153.  Id. at 881. 
 154.  Id. at 878. 
 155.  Id. 
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the average audience test does not automatically jump from similarity to 
appropriation without consideration of whether copying has occurred,156 as 
the substantial similarity test does.157 
However, much like the substantial similarity test, the average 
audience test fails to provide guidelines that allow the trier of fact to make 
consistent or reasonable determinations about what constitutes 
infringement.158 The substantial similarity test suffers from inconsistent 
understandings between courts of what percentage of a defendant’s work 
must be “like” that of a copyrighted work in order for the defendant’s 
work to constitute copyright infringement.159 Without guidelines to 
determine percentages (or some other more meaningful standard of 
similarity), courts are left to their own devices in determining what they 
consider “substantial similarity.”160 
At its core, the average audience test announced by the Ninth Circuit 
similarly requires the factfinder to make a decision regarding the closeness 
between two works without any objective framework or guidelines to rely 
on.161 In future cases using the average audience test, courts will be 
required to determine on their own whether an appropriation would be 
recognizable to the average audience.162 While it has yet to be seen 
whether courts will be able to produce more consistent decisions under the 
average audience test than they have under the substantial similarity test, 
the test exhibits the same lack of guidelines that has led to inconsistency163 
in substantial similarity contexts. 
Finally, the average audience test replicates the substantial similarity 
test’s focus on similarity rather than harm. The recognizability of an audio 
recording’s appropriation depends upon the characteristics of the two 
sound recordings rather than on the context in which the recordings exist. 
Nowhere in the average audience test is there a component which takes 
into account the impact of the appropriations upon the parties involved.164 
Since the average audience may well be able to recognize an appropriation 
in contexts where that appropriation does no harm to the copyright holder, 
the average audience runs the same risk as the substantial similarity test of 
 
 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  See Lape, supra note 89. 
 158.  See VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 871. 
 159.  See Cohen, supra note 121, at 741–44. 
 160.  See Lape, supra note 89, at 190–94. 
 161.  See VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 878–89. 
 162.  Id. 
 163.  See Lape, supra note 89, at 190–94. 
 164.  See VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 878–89. 
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creating “random windfall” for the copyright holder.165 If the substantial 
similarity test’s failure to consider harm to the defendant is inconsistent 
with the purposes of copyright law,166 then another test that also fails to 
consider harm to the defendant must be equally inconsistent with the 
purposes of copyright law. 
Thus, the average audience appears to be as deficient as the substantial 
similarity test in creating predictability in decisions and in factoring 
damage to the copyright holder in its punishment of copyright infringers. 
In fact, the average audience test may be even more likely to yield 
inconsistent or unreasonable decisions than the substantial similarity test. 
While the substantial similarity test requires the trier of fact to make a 
difficult decision based on limited guidelines, the average audience test 
requires the trier of fact to make functionally the same difficult decision, 
with the same limited guidelines, while stepping into the shoes of a 
hypothetical “average” group of people.167 This additional inferential step 
is unlikely to provide any of the clarity necessary to improve the 
consistency or reasonableness of decisions in the lower courts. The 
question of what constitutes an “average audience” is never defined,168 and 
even if it were defined, it seems difficult to imagine that each factfinder 
would have an identical opinion of what this average audience might 
think. 
V. PROPOSALS TO IMPROVE UPON THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S APPROACH 
It appears that while the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of congressional intent 
is proper, the rule that this analysis yields is highly problematic. 
Conversely, while the Sixth Circuit’s decision to ignore Congress’s intent 
was widely criticized,169 the rule resulting from this analysis meshes with 
certain purposes of copyright law far more easily.170 This is not an easy 
circuit split to resolve. Given that many of the serious criticisms of the 
substantial similarity test seem to apply to the average audience test, it is 
tempting to say that the Ninth Circuit was wrong to create a split with the 
Sixth Circuit, and that the average audience test represents a step 
backwards. However, while the average audience test may run counter to 
 
 
 165.  See Lape, supra note 89, at 195–96, 196 n.74. 
 166.  Id. at 194–97; Cohen, supra note 121, at 740 n.71; Palmer, supra note 121. 
 167.  See VMG Salsoul, 824 F.3d at 878–89. 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  See Schietinger, supra note 4, at 210; Brandes, supra note 10, at 104–06; Esannason, supra 
note 1; Lloyd, supra note 5. 
 170.  See Horowitz, supra note 68. 
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the goal of creating clarity in copyright law,171 the bright-line Bridgeport 
rule runs counter to the intent of Congress in passing the Copyright Act to 
promote creative expression.172 While VMG Salsoul may be improved by 
altering its adopted test in order to bring it more in line with the 
Congress’s goal to promote clarity in copyright decisions, it is impossible 
to cure Bridgeport’s failure to consider Congress’s goal to promote artistic 
expression without overruling Bridgeport completely. For this reason, the 
VMG Salsoul test must be favored over the Bridgeport test. The easiest 
way to bring current law on the issue of de minimis exceptions in digital 
music copyrights more in line with the goals of Congress is to tweak the 
Ninth Circuit’s average audience test rather than to revert to the bright-line 
Bridgeport rule. 
There have been a number of suggestions among commentators as to 
how the substantial similarity test could be changed to bring it more in line 
with the public policy goals of copyright law.173 Conceivably, these 
suggestions could be adapted to the average audience test. 
One proposal is to allow musical experts to serve as the trier of fact 
rather than laypeople or judges not well-versed in the musical industry.174 
However, this proposal applies poorly to the average audience test for 
multiple reasons. First, the element of selecting a specific set of jurors 
from a limited pool runs counter to the entire American judicial process.175 
Second, it is difficult to see how the findings of a jury of experts would be 
an improvement over the findings of a jury of laypeople. A jury of experts 
might be capable of analyzing an appropriation within the framework of 
what is considered acceptable within their field,176 but it is hard to imagine 
that this would provide significantly greater consistency to users of 
copyrighted material in the decision-making process. If the criteria through 
which de minimis exceptions are found remains undefined, the subjective 
decisions of twelve people, whether they be laypeople or experts, will 
remain unlikely to provide any sort of clarity to an entirely different subset 
of people (copyright holders and music producers) in their attempt to 
predict whether a contemplated future instance of sampling is likely to be 
 
 
 171.  Id.  
 172.  Brandes, supra note 10, at 104–06. 
 173.  See Palmer, supra note 121; Cohen, supra note 121; Lape, supra note 89. 
 174.  See Palmer, supra note 121. 
 175.  See Mark Houser, The Importance of Representative Juries, 87 JUDICATURE 99, 99 (2003) 
(“[T]rial by jury is a showcase, a public reminder of our republic’s fundamental principle: Government 
is of the people, by the people, for the people . . . . Courts have a responsibility to make sure their jury 
pools represent all citizens.”).  
 176.  See Palmer, supra note 121, at 931–33. 
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legal. In fact, within the confines of the Ninth Circuit’s standard, it may be 
even more difficult for experts than for laypeople to determine what an 
“average audience” would recognize. 
A less experimental solution would be for the courts or the legislature 
to provide objective criteria by which a musical sampling could be 
measured in a de minimis analysis. This solution has been proposed by 
numerous commentators with regard to the substantial similarity test.177 
This could be easily applied to the average audience if, for example, the 
courts specified that a sample less than one second long would 
automatically fit within the de minimis exception for copyright 
infringement. In such a case, copyright holders, license holders, and 
producers would be able to consistently determine without a trial whether 
an instance of sampling would be considered de minimis.178 One issue with 
this particular solution is that objective criteria may prove to be poor 
proxies for the recognizability of an instance of sampling. It is difficult to 
say that an instance of sampling less than a second long cannot be 
instantly recognizable to the vast majority of listeners.179 Conversely, a 
sample more than a second long might be totally unrecognizable to anyone 
but the original artist. It would be tremendously difficult to ask courts to 
come up with objective criteria that perfectly capture the magnitude of 
artistic appropriations. 
However, while it may not result in an ideal test, the notion of 
incorporating some transparent element of objectivity180 into the average 
audience test would represent a step forward as long as the test still leaves 
ultimate discretion to the court as to what appropriation is recognizable to 
the average audience. As noted above, objective criteria may make a poor 
proxy for the recognizability of an appropriation, but by leaving a 
discretionary component for the court to work with, the impact of this 
problem could be somewhat mitigated.  
For example, the Ninth Circuit could have suggested that a sample 
shorter than one second will always be considered de minimis barring 
exceptional circumstances, that a sample longer than three seconds will 
not be considered de minimis barring exceptional circumstances, and that a 
sample in between those lengths will be subject to the current average 
audience test. The incorporation of a modicum of transparent objective 
 
 
 177.  See Cohen, supra note 121, at 758–60; Lape, supra note 89, at 190–94; Lieberman, supra 
note 115, at 109. 
 178.  See Lape, supra note 89, at 98. 
 179.  See Cohen, supra note 121. 
 180.  Id. 
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criteria has been suggested by commentators in the area of the substantial 
similarity test,181 and it seems that the same suggestions could be equally 
applicable to the average audience test. 
The court could also have specified that beyond length, considerations 
like the sampled work’s critical success, commercial success, or popularity 
as a source of samples could all factor into the application of the average 
audience test when it must be applied.182 If these types of semi-objective 
criteria were applied in a non-mandatory fashion, district courts would still 
have discretion to deal with cases where the objective criteria do not 
adequately represent the type of appropriation that has occurred, but 
producers and copyright holders would have a better sense of what will 
generally constitute a de minimis appropriation. 
Finally, requiring plaintiffs to show financial harm in order to avoid a 
finding that an appropriation is de minimis would improve the Ninth 
Circuit’s test by reducing the chances of “random windfall”183 to plaintiffs 
who have not suffered harm in fact through the defendant’s use of their 
work. The average audience test, as it is currently formulated, does not 
account at any point for a showing of financial harm. By formulating the 
test so that an appropriation would automatically be considered de minimis 
if the plaintiff does not demonstrate meaningful financial harm, the court 
could avoid the scenario in which a plaintiff not harmed by the 
defendant’s appropriation receives statutory compensation.184 
Even a more moderate form of this requirement, where the burden of 
proof is shifted to the defendant, would improve the Ninth Circuit’s test. 
Under such a formulation, the defendant could be given the opportunity to 
prove that the plaintiff suffered no harm from the appropriation, in which 
case the appropriation would be considered de minimis. This addition to 
the test would not eliminate completely the possibility of random windfall 
to the plaintiff, but it would reduce the likelihood of such windfall 
occurring.185 
 
 
 181.  See Lape, supra note 89; Cohen, supra note 121, at 758–60; Lieberman, supra note 115, at 
109. 
 182.  Very few cases exist in which the average audience test is applied, and where it is applied, no 
court has yet incorporated any objective criteria in its application. The District Court for the Central 
District of California appeared to come the closest by recognizing that alterations to an original work 
likely render the work less recognizable to an average audience. See Steward v. West, No. 
CV1302449BROJCX, 2014 WL 12591933 (C.D. Cal Aug. 14, 2014). Even in that case though, no 
objective criteria were applied to the alterations. Id. 
 183.  See Lape, supra note 89, at 195–96, 196 n.74. 
 184.  Id.  
 185.  Id.  
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CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in VMG Salsoul feels like the product of 
widespread disapproval of the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Bridgeport. 
While it is a step too far to say that commentators directly influenced the 
opinion of the court, the wealth of scholarly articles criticizing the Sixth 
Circuit’s decision bear witness to the climate of general discontent with 
the Bridgeport decision.186 In addition to scholarly critiques, decisions of 
lower courts outside the purview of the Sixth Circuit have run counter to 
the Bridgeport decision, adding judicial weight to the criticisms of the 
opinion.187 The VMG Salsoul opinion appears to respond to the perceived 
injustices of the Bridgeport decision in knowingly creating a circuit 
split.188 
However, while the Bridgeport decision was easy to criticize from an 
academic perspective, its emphasis on a bright-line rule eliminating the de 
minimis exception to infringement made some sense given the priorities of 
copyright law.189 United States copyright law has always strived for clarity 
so that creators of artistic content would not have to live in the shadow of 
doubt that they may be violating federal law.190 It would have been 
difficult to adopt a bright-line rule in a decision contrary to Bridgeport, 
and indeed the Ninth Circuit does not adopt an easily applied test in VMG 
Salsoul. The Sixth Circuit was criticized in scholarly literature for being 
overly concerned with the practical consequences of its decision rather 
than delivering an opinion founded on proper legal analysis.191 While that 
critique may have merit, the critics of the Bridgeport decision seemed to 
rarely consider the consequences of a contrary decision.192 
In VMG Salsoul, the approach taken by the court was to adopt the 
average audience test.193 Since the scholarly work in this area of de 
minimis exceptions has tended to concentrate on the errors of the Sixth 
Circuit194 rather than on a test that could alternatively be applied, there are 
 
 
 186.  See Schietinger, supra note 4, at 210; Brandes, supra note 10, at 104–06; Esannason, supra 
note 1; Lloyd, supra note 5. 
 187.  See Lloyd, supra note 5, at 159. 
 188.  See VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 886 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 189.  See Horowitz, supra note 68. 
 190.  Id. 
 191.  See, e.g., Schietinger, supra note 4, at 230–42; Brandes, supra note 10, at 104–06; 
Esannason, supra note 1, at 558–60; Lloyd, supra note 5. 
 192.  See, e.g., Schietinger, supra note 4, at 230–42; Brandes, supra note 10, at 104–06; 
Esannason, supra note 1, at 558–60; Lloyd, supra note 5. 
 193.  VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 194.  See Schietinger, supra note 4, at 230–42; Brandes, supra note 10, at 104–06; Esannason, 
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few articles that discuss the average audience test or its practical 
deficiencies. However, there is a great deal of literature regarding the 
substantial similarity test, which is used in other copyright contexts.195 
Almost universally, the substantial similarity test is criticized for its 
failure to produce predictable results and for its strict focus on similarity 
rather than financial harm to the copyright holder, potentially resulting in 
unwarranted “random windfall” for the copyright holder.196 Both the 
unpredictability of the test and the random windfall it generates run 
counter to well-established tenets of copyright law.197 Both of these 
problems seem to apply to the average audience test just as much as the 
substantial similarity test. 
There is no easy resolution to this circuit split. One court’s decision has 
long been criticized for misreading the statute it applied to the case and 
ignoring legislative history;198 the other court’s decision adopts a test that 
appears likely to run counter to several important goals of copyright 
law.199 
Ultimately, while the Ninth Circuit’s decision must be preferred over 
the Sixth Circuit’s, it is crucial to note the problems likely to result from 
the adoption of the average audience test.200 If the average audience test 
can be improved, potentially through the adoption of transparent objective 
criteria or an increased emphasis within the test on financial damages 
resulting to the copyright owner as a basis for damages,201 the Ninth 
Circuit’s rule could be tweaked to create greater predictability within the 
de minimis analysis and provide more reasonable penalties for copyright 
infringers.202 This would bring the rule closer to fulfilling the goals of 
copyright law while still remaining true (unlike the Sixth Circuit’s 
Bridgeport rule) to Congress’s goal in passing the Copyright Act of 
promoting artistic expression. 203 
 
 
 
supra note 1; Lloyd, supra note 5. 
 195.  See Lape, supra note 89; Cohen, supra note 121. 
 196.  See Lape, supra note 89, at 195–96. 
 197.  See Lape, supra note 89; Horowitz, supra note 68. 
 198.  See Schietinger, supra note 4, at 210; Brandes, supra note 10, at 104–06; Esannason, supra 
note 1; Lloyd, supra note 5. 
 199.  See Lape, supra note 89; Horowitz, supra note 68. 
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 203.  See VMG Salsoul, LLC v. Ciccone, 824 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Schietinger, supra 
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